-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2017-10917 / XSA-221 version 4 NULL pointer deref in event channel poll UPDATES IN VERSION 4 ==================== Normalize version tags. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= When polling event channels, in general arbitrary port numbers can be specified. Specifically, there is no requirement that a polled event channel ports has ever been created. When the code was generalised from an earlier implementation, introducing some intermediate pointers, a check should have been made that these intermediate pointers are non-NULL. However, that check was omitted. IMPACT ====== A malicious or buggy guest may cause the hypervisor to access addresses it doesn't control, usually leading to a host crash (Denial of Service). Information leaks cannot be excluded. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Xen versions 4.4 and newer are vulnerable. Xen versions 4.3 and earlier are not affected. Both x86 and ARM systems are vulnerable. While all guest kinds can cause a Denial of Service, only x86 PV guests may be able to leverage the possible information leaks. MITIGATION ========== There is no known mitigation. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Ankur Arora of Oracle. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa221.patch xen-unstable - Xen 4.4.x $ sha256sum xsa221* 2425396a713466808b0f75f91337be4dd20a4dee7733972b04489773c6e97655 xsa221.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFABAEBCAAqFiEEI+MiLBRfRHX6gGCng/4UyVfoK9kFAmV8b/cMHHBncEB4ZW4u b3JnAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZq9cH/AkM6FqUfqwvzm8a2Is1ok6pHoaLICyQfqwgBSQ6 c2h4ZoP5G6ukn3tu7D97smGKGviiAtF4lIjzA/rlUwzNjwHi9HYDVn5nb+JGXW3H W/FDKE4wRUHQDVfoGkFDTyI4jyfDk17dquYc6CLmVGy4fgD0K+sszRxLaj5Go+VW VFudV8qjtrSS6gUzb6CPP9x4morZNORKo64ZtgxfrlVac94XefNiy6wt1wDVbeUS 9gnn2ApvH+YfFaziaEatJYWFj9i99oJiunS/EymuXBQsGnfeKPVsGX1KUcw3jdpn n44xnQ56EmvwMELribF9AXWhIKyh2stxzzE9l9f3BWNPjnA= =ps/H -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----