-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2018-7540 / XSA-252 version 3 DoS via non-preemptable L3/L4 pagetable freeing UPDATES IN VERSION 3 ==================== CVE assigned. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= Guests have the ability to request removal of memory from themselves. This operation is intended to be requested for normal read/write pages, but is also permitted to be used on other types of pages. So far this in particular included pages pinned to their current type, with the necessary unpinning happening implicitly. The unpinning of higher level page tables can, however, take a significant amount of time, and hence is generally expected to be carried out with intermediate preemption checks. Such checks were missing from the code path involved here. IMPACT ====== A malicious guest administrator can cause a Denial of Service (DoS). Specifically, prevent use of a physical CPU for a significant period of time. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== All Xen versions are vulnerable. Only x86 systems are affected. ARM systems are not affected. Only PV guests can leverage this vulnerability. HVM guests cannot leverage this vulnerability. MITIGATION ========== Running only HVM guests will avoid this issue. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Jann Horn of Google Project Zero. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa252.patch xen-unstable, Xen 4.10.0 xsa252-4.9.patch Xen 4.9.x, Xen 4.8.x xsa252-4.7.patch Xen 4.7.x xsa252-4.6.patch Xen 4.6.x, Xen 4.5.x $ sha256sum xsa252* 5bf651378b92520969cde49d11500bcaeffab15590d21c16736be408a85ab3fa xsa252.meta 53174dfd05eb274431dc756c9c3a39b355d485d6c9d12a8797b350bab343d22e xsa252.patch b7ba005fa62ace07f4880cc79824968c24ead3182245e4ed3a6e22cf8d2d7c05 xsa252-4.6.patch 14f37eb6b7a9fb19b258ca3c0e2da71dbc4240e6273137d5eb4003b122101aa6 xsa252-4.7.patch cb679f2145e76b1c754c4377b397d201007f50438ee18e451c4b0da3f510a293 xsa252-4.9.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJal/zQAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZKAAH+gKqf6lQicFUpzEGqbVbXTg9 DYm8S6nKvn5/tgcquznswDZ2EpEMN4j8NaII4it2UQSZo7jOn7FOxiewdhAHcIAf vW2MHz9tkE+DXPOod4tDwhjonzLo1n0uqVuoUylq8atIrX2KxcSDJAbRp78lmUoY rxklw0uOlpno4hAJ4BaNY+fvjDyPBksApstJ6CZ/BUhaJeebYHbkCo92CTUvcThg xdA/M+w62plLCpwdnAJY5YV8NP32I5FNTe0sPnpszfk+gyDTLBMDHXdr+yegGayt ZvcH5c/NEeqeeF+MSd6ibnVfboQilDoPCnf9iL5ISOHtajkR2TK2vToi2hWQsi4= =Bn7r -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----