1.1 --- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c	Wed Feb 03 09:42:45 2010 +0000
     1.2 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c	Wed Feb 03 09:44:12 2010 +0000
     1.3 @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static void map_cpu_to_logical_apicid(vo
     1.4  /* State of each CPU. */
     1.5  DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, cpu_state) = { 0 };
     1.6  
     1.7 -static void *stack_base[NR_CPUS];
     1.8 +void *stack_base[NR_CPUS];
     1.9  DEFINE_SPINLOCK(cpu_add_remove_lock);
    1.10  
    1.11  /*

     2.1 --- a/xen/arch/x86/tboot.c	Wed Feb 03 09:42:45 2010 +0000
     2.2 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/tboot.c	Wed Feb 03 09:44:12 2010 +0000
     2.3 @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static void update_iommu_mac(vmac_ctx_t 
     2.4  }
     2.5  
     2.6  #define is_page_in_use(page) \
     2.7 -    ((page->count_info & PGC_count_mask) != 0 || page->count_info == 0)
     2.8 +    (page_state_is(page, inuse) || page_state_is(page, offlining))
     2.9  
    2.10  static void update_pagetable_mac(vmac_ctx_t *ctx)
    2.11  {
    2.12 @@ -236,6 +236,30 @@ static void tboot_gen_domain_integrity(c
    2.13      memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
    2.14  }
    2.15  
    2.16 +/*
    2.17 + * For stack overflow detection in debug build, a guard page is set up.
    2.18 + * This fn is used to detect whether a page is in the guarded pages for
    2.19 + * the above reason.
    2.20 + */
    2.21 +static int mfn_in_guarded_stack(unsigned long mfn)
    2.22 +{
    2.23 +    extern void *stack_base[NR_CPUS];
    2.24 +    void *p;
    2.25 +    int i;
    2.26 +
    2.27 +    for ( i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++ )
    2.28 +    {
    2.29 +        if ( !stack_base[i] )
    2.30 +            continue;
    2.31 +        p = (void *)((unsigned long)stack_base[i] + STACK_SIZE -
    2.32 +                     PRIMARY_STACK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE);
    2.33 +        if ( mfn == virt_to_mfn(p) )
    2.34 +            return -1;
    2.35 +    }
    2.36 +
    2.37 +    return 0;
    2.38 +}
    2.39 +
    2.40  static void tboot_gen_xenheap_integrity(const uint8_t key[TB_KEY_SIZE],
    2.41                                          vmac_t *mac)
    2.42  {
    2.43 @@ -250,8 +274,21 @@ static void tboot_gen_xenheap_integrity(
    2.44  
    2.45          if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) )
    2.46              continue;
    2.47 +        if ( (mfn << PAGE_SHIFT) < __pa(&_end) )
    2.48 +            continue; /* skip Xen */
    2.49 +        if ( (mfn >= PFN_DOWN(g_tboot_shared->tboot_base - 3 * PAGE_SIZE))
    2.50 +             && (mfn < PFN_UP(g_tboot_shared->tboot_base
    2.51 +                              + g_tboot_shared->tboot_size
    2.52 +                              + 3 * PAGE_SIZE)) )
    2.53 +            continue; /* skip tboot and its page tables */
    2.54 +
    2.55          if ( is_page_in_use(page) && is_xen_heap_page(page) ) {
    2.56 -            void *pg = mfn_to_virt(mfn);
    2.57 +            void *pg;
    2.58 +
    2.59 +            if ( mfn_in_guarded_stack(mfn) )
    2.60 +                continue; /* skip guard stack, see memguard_guard_stack() in mm.c */
    2.61 +
    2.62 +            pg = mfn_to_virt(mfn);
    2.63              vmac_update((uint8_t *)pg, PAGE_SIZE, &ctx);
    2.64          }
    2.65      }
    2.66 @@ -266,12 +303,27 @@ static void tboot_gen_xenheap_integrity(
    2.67  static void tboot_gen_frametable_integrity(const uint8_t key[TB_KEY_SIZE],
    2.68                                             vmac_t *mac)
    2.69  {
    2.70 +    unsigned int sidx, eidx, nidx;
    2.71 +    unsigned int max_idx = (max_pdx + PDX_GROUP_COUNT - 1)/PDX_GROUP_COUNT;
    2.72      uint8_t nonce[16] = {};
    2.73      vmac_ctx_t ctx;
    2.74  
    2.75      vmac_set_key((uint8_t *)key, &ctx);
    2.76 -    *mac = vmac((uint8_t *)frame_table,
    2.77 -                PFN_UP(max_pdx * sizeof(*frame_table)), nonce, NULL, &ctx);
    2.78 +    for ( sidx = 0; ; sidx = nidx )
    2.79 +    {
    2.80 +        eidx = find_next_zero_bit(pdx_group_valid, max_idx, sidx);
    2.81 +        nidx = find_next_bit(pdx_group_valid, max_idx, eidx);
    2.82 +        if ( nidx >= max_idx )
    2.83 +            break;
    2.84 +        vmac_update((uint8_t *)pdx_to_page(sidx * PDX_GROUP_COUNT),
    2.85 +                       pdx_to_page(eidx * PDX_GROUP_COUNT)
    2.86 +                       - pdx_to_page(sidx * PDX_GROUP_COUNT), &ctx);
    2.87 +    }
    2.88 +    vmac_update((uint8_t *)pdx_to_page(sidx * PDX_GROUP_COUNT),
    2.89 +                   pdx_to_page(max_pdx - 1) + 1
    2.90 +                   - pdx_to_page(sidx * PDX_GROUP_COUNT), &ctx);
    2.91 +
    2.92 +    *mac = vmac(NULL, 0, nonce, NULL, &ctx);
    2.93  
    2.94      printk("MAC for frametable is: 0x%08"PRIx64"\n", *mac);
    2.95  

     3.1 --- a/xen/common/page_alloc.c	Wed Feb 03 09:42:45 2010 +0000
     3.2 +++ b/xen/common/page_alloc.c	Wed Feb 03 09:44:12 2010 +0000
     3.3 @@ -932,8 +932,6 @@ void init_xenheap_pages(paddr_t ps, padd
     3.4      if ( pe <= ps )
     3.5          return;
     3.6  
     3.7 -    memguard_guard_range(maddr_to_virt(ps), pe - ps);
     3.8 -
     3.9      /*
    3.10       * Yuk! Ensure there is a one-page buffer between Xen and Dom zones, to
    3.11       * prevent merging of power-of-two blocks across the zone boundary.
    3.12 @@ -943,6 +941,8 @@ void init_xenheap_pages(paddr_t ps, padd
    3.13      if ( !is_xen_heap_mfn(paddr_to_pfn(pe)) )
    3.14          pe -= PAGE_SIZE;
    3.15  
    3.16 +    memguard_guard_range(maddr_to_virt(ps), pe - ps);
    3.17 +
    3.18      init_heap_pages(maddr_to_page(ps), (pe - ps) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
    3.19  }
    3.20