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            Xen Security Advisory CVE-2026-23555 / XSA-481
                               version 2

                 Xenstored DoS by unprivileged domain

UPDATES IN VERSION 2
====================

Public release.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION
=================

Any guest issuing a Xenstore command accessing a node using the
(illegal) node path "/local/domain/", will crash xenstored due to a
clobbered error indicator in xenstored when verifying the node path.

Note that the crash is forced via a failing assert() statement in
xenstored. In case xenstored is being built with NDEBUG #defined,
an unprivileged guest trying to access the node path "/local/domain/"
will result in it no longer being serviced by xenstored, other guests
(including dom0) will still be serviced, but xenstored will use up
all cpu time it can get.

IMPACT
======

Any unprivileged domain can cause xenstored to crash, causing a
DoS (denial of service) for any Xenstore action. This will result
in an inability to perform further domain administration on the host.

In case xenstored has been built with NDEBUG defined, an unprivileged
domain can force xenstored to be 100% busy, but without harming
xenstored functionality for other guests otherwise.

VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
==================

All Xen systems from Xen 4.18 onwards are vulnerable. Systems up to
Xen 4.17 are not vulnerable.

Systems using the C variant of xenstored are vulnerable. Systems using
xenstore-stubdom or the OCaml variant of Xenstore (oxenstored) are not
vulnerable.

MITIGATION
==========

There is no known mitigation available.

CREDITS
=======

This issue was discovered by Marek Marczykowski-Góreckiof
Invisible Things Lab.

RESOLUTION
==========

Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue.

Note that patches for released versions are generally prepared to
apply to the stable branches, and may not apply cleanly to the most
recent release tarball.  Downstreams are encouraged to update to the
tip of the stable branch before applying these patches.

xsa481.patch         xen-unstable - Xen 4.18.x

$ sha256sum xsa481*
148147e4545a4670578c0f24aa136f67bc203c7b18ec980b8cc80cfbb04ace68  xsa481.patch
$

DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
=========================

Deployment of the patch described above (or
others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the
embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
administrators.

But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
members of the predisclosure list).

Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
Team.

Switching xenstored with oxenstored or xenstore-stubdom is not permitted
as a mitigation, as this is a guest visible change of the configuration.

(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
is then no longer applicable.  This is to enable the community to have
oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)

For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
  http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html
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