|Public release ||2015-06-02 12:00|
|Updated ||2015-06-02 14:02|
|Title ||Guest triggerable qemu MSI-X pass-through error messages|
Filesadvisory-130.txt (signed advisory file)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Xen Security Advisory CVE-2015-4105 / XSA-130
Guest triggerable qemu MSI-X pass-through error messages
UPDATES IN VERSION 2
Device model code dealing with guest PCI MSI-X interrupt management
activities logs messages on certain (supposedly) invalid guest
A buggy or malicious guest repeatedly invoking such operations may
result in the host disk to fill up, possibly leading to a Denial of
Xen versions 3.3 and onwards are vulnerable due to supporting PCI
Only x86 systems are vulnerable. ARM systems are not vulnerable.
Only HVM guests with their device model run in Dom0 can take advantage
of this vulnerability.
Only HVM guests which have been granted access to physical PCI devices
(`PCI passthrough') can take advantage of this vulnerability.
Furthermore, the vulnerability is only applicable when the
passed-through PCI devices are MSI-X capable. (Many modern devices
This issue can be avoided by not assigning MSI-X capable PCI devices to
untrusted HVM guests.
This issue can also be avoided by only using PV guests.
It can also be avoided by configuring HVM guests with their device
model run in a separate (stub) domain. (When using xl, this can be
requested with "device_model_stubdomain_override=1" in the domain
This issue was discovered by Jan Beulich of SUSE.
Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue.
xsa130-qemuu.patch qemu-upstream-unstable, Xen 4.5.x, Xen 4.4.x
xsa130-qemuu-4.3.patch Xen 4.3.x
xsa130-qemut.patch qemu-xen-unstable, Xen 4.5.x, Xen 4.4.x, Xen 4.3.x, Xen 4.2.x
$ sha256sum xsa130*.patch
DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or
others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the
embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
members of the predisclosure list).
Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have
oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)
For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux)
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Xenproject.org Security Team