|Public release ||2015-10-29 11:59|
|Updated ||2015-10-29 11:59|
|Title ||arm: Race between domain destruction and memory allocation decrease|
Filesadvisory-147.txt (signed advisory file)
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Xen Security Advisory CVE-2015-7814 / XSA-147
arm: Race between domain destruction and memory allocation decrease
UPDATES IN VERSION 3
While freeing the memory associated with a domain during domain
destruction Xen could race with a toolstack domain reducing the
amount of memory associated with that same domain via the
In the case where this race is hit the host will crash.
The race is not exposed via the XENMEM_remove_from_physmap or
Domains deliberately given partial management control may be able to
deny service by crashing the host.
Such a domain needs to be granted access to at least one of
XENMEM_decrease_reservation or XEN_DOMCTL_destroydomain over another
As a result, in a system designed to enhance security by radically
disaggregating the management, the security may be reduced. But, the
security will be no worse than a non-disaggregated design.
This issue is only relevant to systems which intend to increase
security through the use of advanced disaggregated management
This does not include systems using libxl, libvirt, or OpenStack
(unless substantially modified or supplemented, as compared to
versions supplied by the respective upstreams).
Only ARM systems are potentially affected. All Xen versions which
support ARM are potentially affected.
x86 systems are not affected.
There is no known mitigation.
Switching from disaggregated to a non-disaggregated operation does NOT
mitigate these vulnerabilities. Rather, it simply recategorises the
vulnerability to hostile management code, regarding it "as designed";
thus it merely reclassifies these issues as "not a bug". Users and
vendors of disaggregated systems should not change their
This issue was discovered by Ian Campbell of Citrix.
Applying the attached patch resolves this issue.
xsa147.patch xen-unstable, Xen 4.6.x, Xen 4.5.x, Xen 4.4.x
$ sha256sum xsa147*.patch
DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or
others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the
embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
members of the predisclosure list).
Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have
oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)
For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
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Xenproject.org Security Team