|Public release ||2014-06-17 11:44|
|Updated ||2014-06-17 11:44|
|CVE(s) ||none (yet) assigned|
|Title ||unexpected pitfall in xenaccess API|
Filesadvisory-99.txt (signed advisory file)
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Xen Security Advisory XSA-99
unexpected pitfall in xenaccess API
UPDATES IN VERSION 2
Added note regarding CVE.
A test/example program, for exercising the Xen memaccess API, does not
take all necessary precautions against hostile guest behaviour.
As a result, software developers using it as an example or template
might have written and deployed vulnerable code.
See the patch for technical details of the problem.
Deployments of software inspired by, or derived from,
xen.git/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c, may be vulnerable to
privilege escalation by a malicious guest administrator.
xen-access is a test/example program and is not, without modification,
useful in production. It is not built or installed by default.
Unmodified Xen installations (including installations as provided by
typical Free Software distributions) are not vulnerable.
The following toolstacks/libraries do not use memaccess, so systems
using Xen only via the following are not vulnerable:
libxl; xl; xend; xm; libvirt
In general, Xen installations which make no use of the Xen memory
access API (xc_mem_access_..., "XENMEM_access_...",
XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS_ENABLE) are not vulnerable.
Systems using the Xen hypervisor 4.1 or earlier are not vulnerable.
ARM systems are not vulnerable. AMD systems are not vulnerable.
Intel x86 systems without EPT are not vulnerable.
Software developers who have based their efforts on xen-access.c may
have constructed vulnerable systems. Such developers should examine
their software, and communicate with their own downstreams, as
Users of Xen-derived systems, whose vulnerability is not excluded
above, should consult their vendor for information about the
applicability of this vulnerability.
Disabling whatever functionality uses the memaccess API will avoid the
NOTE REGARDING CVE
The CVE assignment team at the MITRE CVE Numbering Authority have told
us that type of issue is typically considered site-specific and is not
eligible for a CVE ID:
The scope of CVE does not include issues where a vulnerable program
can be present after a customer modifies shipped source code or
modifies the build process. The primary purpose of this guideline is
to avoid CVE assignments where, for example, the vulnerability exists
only when a customer enables experimental code and then recompiles. A
secondary purpose of this guideline is to avoid CVE assignments for
example code that wasn't intended to be used as-is.
Software developers who have based production code on xen-access.c
should obtain their own CVE number(s).
This vulnerability was discovered by Ian Campbell of Citrix.
The attached patch repairs the test/example utility provided in the
Xen Project source tree.
To resolve the issue in production software, appropriate changes
will have to be be made by its developers.
$ sha256sum xsa99*.patch
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Xenproject.org Security Team